Create CREAM Listing Team

Summary

Create an elected group that will manage the asset listing process to improve research and security of incoming assets, reduce governance overhead, and expedite implementation. This will onboard more collateral to increase TVL and fees.

Motivation

This proposal comes from the confusion and friction I’ve heard and personally experienced had seen in listing new assets. It’s hard for teams trying to list their asset on Cream to know:

  • What are the requirements for getting listed? (liquidity, age, security audits, etc.)

  • What is the whole process is to get listed and how long until my asset is implemented? (also seems most don’t know that they need to do a 2nd vote to be able to take out loans on their asset)

  • Who do I go to for advice on getting listed and engaging the community?

  • How do I get a vote up if I don’t have sufficient CREAM? ($300k is steep requirement even for active CREAM members like me)

CREAM started out as the “fast and scrappy” but listings have started to fall behind compared to speed that tokens are being released on the market. With the addition of LP tokens to the platform the risk of some of these assets is bigger but it also provides a larger market to capture so we need a faster and more reliable process for adding new and high quality assets to the platform This is even more true with the financialization of the NFT market where we could list NFTX LPs, Charged Particles NFTs with embedded ERC20s, or other primitives being released.

The listing team will serve a couple of important functions for the CREAM community:

  • Single point of contact for teams to get information and advice on listing assets

  • Trusted group of advisors for CREAM community to vet tokens and make sure they don’t pose a risk to the platform

  • Streamlined and expedited process for listing assets

  • Potentially collaborate with other protocols like Aave and Maker on our collateral research efforts

Governance Details

The listing team should be like the Spartan council - an elected group with complete autonomy to list assets based on the team’s research. Each team member would receive an NFT that gives them 1 vote. The team must make a unanimous decision on all parameters - interest rate model, collateral factor, and reserve factor - in order to be listed.

Given that almost all proposals need to go through the CREAM team anyway due to the extremely high costs of acquiring the 1,500 tokens required to create a Snapshot vote this doesn’t actually change the listing process all that much, just make it more explicit and expedited.

One key change to governance by adding the listing team would be to revert this proposal that requires all new tokens start at 0% collateral. While a good safety measure it adds lots of friction and governance overhead to the listing process and the precaution won’t be necessary if we have a dedicated team to ensuring quality tokens and appropriate collateral before listing.

Note: This is just a listing team, anyone can create a proposal to delist or change asset parameters at anytime

Note: This listing team only applies to the ETH platform not the BSC platform which will continue as is.

Specification

Open question to CREAM core team - Am I missing any implementation details for listing an asset? I can’t find anything in the docs about which contract/EOA has control over adding/changing assets on the platform

Proposal

For

Create a listing team of elected members that has complete autonomy to list new asset

Against

Do nothing - Keep listing governance as is

6 Likes

I do like the idea of a listing team to help reduce the friction. However, I am not particularly a fan of the full autonomy. I definitely would appreciate their analysis and positioning to remove the 2 step listing process. Also, a specific source to provide guidance is important.

What is wrong with autonomy? And how is that different from the current system where 94% of all proposals are initiated and passed by the core team (source Snaphsot) which doesn’t include all the decisions that don’t even go through governance?

The members of the listing team are always able to be voted out at any time as per Spartan Council spec so there is accountability. And as I mentioned “This is just a listing team, anyone can create a proposal to delist or change asset parameters at anytime” so their decisions aren’t final.

3 Likes

Yeah, i am not a fan of that by the core team either. However, i do understand it. I think there should be the ability to agree on “executive actions” by designated individuals. If the addition/removal is per Spartan Council Spec, then i would be with it because there is still a direct lever of control.

1 Like

Thank you for this, @Kiba! You’ve been a fantastic supporter since the beginning days of our community.

I strongly support this, and have been talking with some qualified folks for this. Let’s start discussing potential candidates for this.

4 Likes

Thanks Lumberg, I know i can be a troll sometimes but I try to contribute as well haha.

I was thinking a 5 person team - 2 from CREAM, 2 community members, and 1 from another lending protocol or some related DeFi project to share research and methodologies. This is small enough to be agile and large/diverse enough to have contrary opinions for good discussions.

3 Likes

This seems like an interesting proposal Kiba, I think that the 5 person team makes sense to have these diversified folks. I’d like to ask if you desire the community members to hold or not hold a certain amount of assets, what they need to/don’t need to disclose they hold; there may be a need to refrain from having individuals voting on assets they hold, so that there may be a need for more people to help make it a fair process.

Additionally, I’m thinking that more of a framework should be established as the “CREAM Guidelines For Listing”, if we can get some dune analytics dashboard or some onchain metrics that measures the liquidity, volatility, user adoption, and product TVL, etc. (perhaps need more advanced metrics like user retention day over day, etc.) in order to comprise of say 50-75% of the points system, and then a yay/nay/abstain vote for the members to create a pseudo-multisig, pseudo automated onchain data framework.
Then we can actually set the default collat ratio based on the scoring of the points, frameshifted to scale. For example, if a project gets 60% vote power across multisig + onchain stats, it starts off at 0% collateral. Then map the 60%-100% vote power to 0-80% LTV, so every 1% vote power above 60% helps move up starting LTV by 2%?

Hope this gives some ideas to go off of

3 Likes

Hey Calvin! Thanks for the input. Definitely down for token disclosure by listing team. Ideally it wont matter since shitcoins would never get unanimous decision and you should be incentivized to list your tokens’ competitors so that you have a market to short them easily. Favorable treatment of meh tokens might eventually create a risk if it happens continuously with no interference from normal governance but that’s why this is just a listing team and not a full management team.

A framework is something I expected to come out of the group instead of a requirement beforehand since currently there isn’t any logic. Like how was SWAG listed? And its cream market is 3x bigger than it’s marketcap?!?

My hope with this team is that we will branch out the cream market and the tokens we list are too diverse to fit into a single points system. How do you compare MASK/ETH LP tokens to LIDO? Totally different markets with no common metrics.

Having collateral ratio scaled according to dex liquidity is a good start to a framework. So long as there is a market to liquidate positions, we don’t list tokens that can go to 0 or have weird tokenomics like aglostables that mess up the comptroller, and there is viable market for us to earn fees, it shouldnt really matter what their users are or if they earn revenue etc.

1 Like

Please also take Price Oracle into consideration

We’ve been cooperating with Chainlink and trying to have them cover 100% of our price feed. You can see our progress here: https://docs.cream.finance/lending/price-oracle
However, it’s rather difficult since there are so many tokens not supported by Chainlink, but we still have to list them. Thus, we sometimes list token first with our self-built price oracle, and then file a request to Chainlink.

To these not-supported-by-Chainlink token, there’s definitely a trade off between speed to the market and decentralized price oracle, but we should always welcome those token (regarding price oracle aspect) supported by Chainlink already.

1 Like

yes definitely agree on oracles, im an og link marine. Even if it’s not an official feed, we can create our own - could be paid for from treasury if we think it’s high value asset or ask the asset’s team to put up LINK for X months of requests until we make enough in fees to pay for the feed. Assets with deep liquidity like RAI or DPI with $+100M liquidity and $+5M daily volume i would feel comfortable with TWAP (those parameters could be in our framework).

Most of the assets i want to list initially are no brainers like sETH and sBTC, Curve pools like crvLINK, high TVL LPs like SNX/ETH, etc. that all already have price feeds for the assets and represent billions of dollars we can bring to the platform.

New to the CREAM DAO, but here’s my 2 cents:

Sub-teams within the DAO is a great idea! Think of it like a consulting group overseeing a project. You’d have a Project Manager (broad skills), a couple strong analysts, and some technical folks. The key is having measurable KPIs that these Teams have to achieve. Without KPIs, things go off the tracks… FAST.

That being said, a listing Team is definitely 1 of many Teams that could help govern and move CREAM forward. I like this idea. Again, what are the KPIs? How are listings tracked? This is all part of the Team’s responsibilities. The Team should also be rewarded if they exceed expectations.

Just a few thoughts.

JonnyFiat

I’m pretty sure the only KPI for CREAM is fees generated which is (total borrowed / total supplied * interest rate) or whatever. Basically listing assets with high mcap and high external utility (farming, staking, shorting, etc.)

CREAM team can definitely correct me if im wrong on this

I don’t mean KPIs in terms of tokens. I mean KPIs that are operational in nature for the Listing Team… meaning X number of reviews in a period, etc, etc.

i see. Did you have any in mind specifically?

I’d focus on efficiency like “# of days between listing approved and live on market” and “% listed that were later voted down by dao” or something like that if we arent looking at financial metrics.

Those are exactly the type of operational KPIs that I had in mind. @lumberg looks like you blessed this proposal… Does @Kiba need any further direction to move this forward?

I’d like to ask some questions:

  1. What is the new listing procedure?
  2. When and where does the team start to participate? Does the team provide opinion to a specific listing case before or after the voting?
  3. Following 2, what is the decision power of this team?

I’m not going to finalize everything right now, but these question are important to the community. I have to bring them up before we empower this listing team.


IMO, the ideal workflow is that the team provides opinion with for / against / neutral to the token listing during its discussion session. That means we should include the team’s opinion in the governance officially. Voting of listing new token cannot kick off (in X days) without the team’s opinion, and the team are obliged to provide opinion in X days.

However, it also leads to some issues like centralization and cherrypicking. For example, what if there are 20 tokens proposal in a week? I don’t think the team can take care of the workload, but who to decide what tokens to be reviewed or not? And how to incentivize the team?

I believe that this team would be very helpful to the whole protocol, but only when it has profession, transparency and decentralized / anti-manipulation at the same time.

3 Likes

I’m just realizing I never linked to the Spartan Council spec which provides some clarity
https://sips.synthetix.io/sips/sip-93. I’ll add it to my original post as well. A tl;dr of its features:

  • team elected by token holders monthly via quadratic voting in current CREAM snapshot space
  • team votes via new snapshot space where each team member has one vote represented by am NFT
  • NFT contract is controlled by CREAM multisig to revoke from voted out members and give to new members
  • team members can be voted out at any time by token holders by changing their vote on snapshot
  • CREAM DAO has veto power over listing team decisions

Answers to your questions:

  1. What is the new listing procedure? - Listing procedure is mostly the same. Community makes proposals for new assets to be add to CREAM platform. Votes happen on a new Snapshot instance where Listing Team has 1 vote per NFT holder instead of all CREAM token holders voting on each proposal. In addition I would also like to override your past proposal that new assets start at 0% collateral and let collateral % be included in listing proposals to streamline process. Reserve % can also be part of listing proposal, if not submitted in a proposal then listing team will add it before voting to add the asset.
  2. When and where does the team start to participate? - Listing team would be commenting on proposals in the forum and discussing with the community member / defi team that is looking to have their asset listed. Listing team will probably be making their own proposals as well and let community comment in the forum before they go to a vote. I would suggest listing team also does a write up of why they listed the asset and process for choosing asset parameters like reserve factor after every vote, even if it fails.
  3. What is the decision power of this team? - The listing team has power to list new assets on CREAM platform without going through standard governance votes. Standard governance still has power to veto listing team decisions. Once an asset is listed, listing team has no control over and standard governance takes over where CREAM community has power to modify listings like increasing collateral, delisting it for whatever reason, etc.

Imo this is favorable to listing team only giving advice/research for a few reasons:

  1. 1,500 CREAM is way too high a barrier of entry for legitimate members to make their own proposal. This means whether an asset goes to a vote (therefore whether it gets listed or not) is up to CREAM team’s discretion at the moment anyway.
  2. If we implement quadratic voting for electing listing team members it allows smaller CREAM holders to have more impact on protocol governance without compromising sybil resistance and spamming by lowering token threshold for creating proposals
  3. Cherry picking is not directly preventable but members can be voted out at anytime so that should disincentive the behaviour initially, and prevent it from happening a second time.
  4. Most people wanting their assets listed dont care about the CREAM platform so dont provide analysis on risks or benefits the token adds to the platform before it goes to vote.

Completely agree and my goal with this is to achieve exactly that. Since creating votes can really only be done by CREAM team or massive whales, implementing a listing team is a massive improvement in all of these categories to the current structure.

Also thanks for all the engagement on this proposal guys. I was not expecting anyone from the community or cream team to be in favor of it haha

Reply to your answer:

  1. I agree that starting at 0% collateral factor should be removed. DAO is not efficient in decision making, and 0% collateral factor make the listing and market even worse.
    However, I don’t agree with reserve factor being decided per voting. IMO we should put token into a few categories and set reserve factor for each of them once and for all (thru DAO of course). Only when it comes to a pretty special case in crypto industry, for example USDT and its risk, should we decide the reserve factor thru the voting by case. Otherwise we should follow some norms by default like Major token: 20%, Governance token 40%.

  2. Seconded, and then we should make “motivation” part necessary in the proposal template.

  3. Not sure when we, as protocol team, should get started on preparing listing in this workstream. Can you elaborate more or raise some example?

  1. Makes sense about the reserve. I don’t feel strongly about that but collateral factor is def a blocker
  2. I think motivation is already part of proposal template just no one uses it lol
  3. I was assuming people from protocol team would be on the listing team but I guess you guys might not want to be on it or wont get elected at all for some reason. In that case the listing team would reach out to protocol team after some initial research once we are confident in an asset and want to make sure it is allowed in the protocol before going more indepth (e.g. making sure something like rebase tokens dont get too far down the pipeline). We can work towards. a formal multi-step, multi-team approach like MakerDAO prioritization. I know conceptually what needs to be done to get an asset listed but if the protocol team could detail step by step the infrastructure and txs that need to be setup to list an asset i can make a more concrete plan about communication between the two teams.